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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS, WINTER 2002
UNITED STATES CELLULAR CORP. V. FCC,
254 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications
Commission's (the "FCC" or "Commission") deci-
sion to eliminate the carrier cost recovery require-
ment for wireless carriers violates the D.C. Cir-
cuit's cost causation principle, whether this deci-
sion was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), and
whether this decision violated the Regulatory
Flexibility Act and the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
Holding: The court denied the petition for re-
view and held that the FCC's decision to eliminate
the carrier cost recovery requirement did not vio-
late the cost causation principle, set forth in Com-
petitive Telecommunications Association v. FCC, 87
F.3d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In addition, the court
found that this decision was not arbitrary and ca-
pricious because the FCC demonstrated sufficient
evidence to conclude that the elimination of this
requirement would not distort the competitive
marketplace and because the FCC had a reasona-
ble justification for eliminating the requirement
solely for wireless carriers. The court also held
that the FCC's decision did not violate the Regula-
tory Flexibility Act because its reasons for dis-
missing alternatives to eliminating the carrier cost
recovery requirement were reasonable. Finally,
the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider the remaining claims.
Discussion: The court determined that carriers,
rather than the Public Safety Answering Points
("PSAPs"), should bear the financial responsibility
for wireless 911 implementation because the
PSAPs are governmental entities providing safety
services to benefit the public and, therefore, are
not the cost causers. Specifically, the court rea-
soned that the FCC's decision to eliminate the
carrier cost recovery requirement for wireless car-
riers does not violate the cost causation principle
because it merely imposes the cost of wireless
E911 service on its beneficiaries. The court also
rejected petitioners' argument that eliminating
this requirement would lead to marketplace inef-
ficiencies. Instead, the court held that obligating
the governmental agencies to cover the costs of
public benefits would create marketplace distor-
tions because it would distort the true cost of do-
ing business in rural areas. In addition, the court
affirmed the Commission's decision to impose a
different E911 implementation scheme upon
wireless carriers and landline carriers because
wireless carriers are regulated differently than
landline ones and, therefore, are able to pass the
implementation costs through to subscribers, who
are the ultimate beneficiaries.
ECHOSTAR COMMUNICATIONS CORP. V.
FCC, 292 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Issue- Whether the FCC erred in holding that
Comcast's decision to move programming from
satellite to terrestrial delivery violated Section
548(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 (the
"1934 Act").
Holding: The court denied EchoStar's petition
for review and held that the FCC's decision was
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.
Discussion: In denying EchoStar's petition, the
court addressed three specific challenges. First,
the court determined that uncorroborated and
untested testimony and hearsay testimony could
constitute substantial evidence. Specifically, the
court found that the FCC was justified in relying
on the affidavit of a Comcast affiliate executive be-
cause the affidavit was made under oath, and
EchoStar introduced no contradictory evidence.
Second, the court held that the FCC did not ig-
nore any significant record evidence presented by
EchoStar. Finally, the court held that the FCC did
not fail to explain its reasons because the FCC's
reasoning and holding are reasonably discerned.
The FCC determined that Comcast had chosen
terrestrial delivery for a valid business reason; this
express determination thereby precludes holding
that Comcast had violated Section 548(b) by seek-
ing to evade the requirements of Section 548(c).
NAT'L PUBLIC RADIO, INC. v. FCC, 254 F.3d
226 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
Issue: Whether the FCC's policy not to exempt
noncommercial educational entities from partici-
pating in broadcast license auctions when they ap-
ply for channels within the unreserved portion of
spectrum violates the Balanced Budget Act of
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1997 ("BBA of 1997"), which requires the FCC to
exempt them from participating in auctions for
any channel, and whether this decision was arbi-
trary and capricious.
Holding- The court vacated portions of the
FCC's order on the basis that the FCC's refusal to
exempt noncommercial educational broadcasters
from auctions for unreserved channels contra-
dicted the Balanced Budget Act's plain language.
Discussion: In vacating the offending portions of
the FCC's order, the court relied on the two-part
test enunciated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The court found that the FCC's action did not
pass muster under step one of the Chevron test be-
cause the BBA of 1997 expressly forbids the FCC
from requiring noncommercial educational
broadcasters to participate in auctions to obtain
licenses for any channel, reserved or unreserved.
Interpreting the plain language of the BBA of
1997, the court held that this denial of authority is
based on the nature of the station that ultimately
receives the license, not on the part of the spec-
trum in which the station operates. In addition,
the court rejected the FCC's argument based on
step two of the Chevron test that the BBA of 1997
was silent as to the FCC's authority to partially ex-
empt noncommercial educational broadcasters.
Again, interpreting the plain language of the BBA
of 1997, the court held that because the language
failed to distinguish between reserved and unre-
served channels, the language evinces Congres-
sional intent to exempt noncommercial educa-
tional broadcasters from generally participating in
all auctions. Because the court held that the
FCC's order conflicted with the plain statutory
language, the court granted the petition for re-
view and vacated the portions of the order requir-
ing noncommercial education broadcasters to
participate in auctions for licenses on the unre-
served spectrum. The court did not address
whether the FCC's decision was arbitrary and ca-
pricious. In his concurrence, Judge Randolph
agreed with the majority that the order should be
vacated and remanded to the FCC but argued
that the statute was ambiguous because the word
"issued" only applied to renewals of existing li-
censes.
Fox TELEVISION STATIONS, INC. v. F.C.C.,
280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Issue: Whether the FCC's decision not to repeal
the national television station ownership
("NTSO") and cable/broadcast cross-ownership
("CBCO") rules following the passage of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act") was
"arbitrary and capricious" in violation of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act ("APA") and the 1996
Act of 1996; and whether the NTSO rule violated
First Amendment's free speech guarantees.
Holding: By vacating and remanding the FCC's
decision not to repeal the NTSO rule during its
biennial review, the court found that the FCC's
reasons against repealing or modifying the NTSO
rule were insufficient and that the rule in its cur-
rent form was in violation of the APA and Section
202(h) of the 1996 Act. The court, however,
found the NTSO rule content-neutral and, there-
fore, applied rational basis review to the rule in
the context of the First Amendment claim. The
court held that a NTSO rule could be rational in
its stated goal of ensuring diversity of ownership
of television stations and, therefore, was not un-
constitutional if properly justified. Additionally,
the court declared that the Commission in failing
to repeal or modify the CBCO rule failed to justify
the retention of the rule as a necessary safeguard
to competition. The court further determined
that the Commission would have a low probability
of justifying the retention of the CBCO rule
under any circumstances and ruled that vacating
the rule would cause little disruption. The court,
therefore, ordered the CBCO rule repealed.
Discussion: With regard to the NTSO issue, the
court's discussion focuses on whether or not the
Commission's reasons for retaining the NTSO
rule without modification were contrary to Sec-
tion 202(h) of the 1996 Act and arbitrary and ca-
pricious. The court determined that the decision
to retain the NTSO rule constituted a change in
the Commission's policy since its release of the
Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, Report &
Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984). Relying on Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983), the court determined that if
the Commission's view changed-even without a
change in circumstances-it must supply a rea-
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soned analysis for its change. The court held that
the Commission failed to do this. On the First
Amendment claim, the court looked to F.C.C. v.
Nat. Citizens Comm. For Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775
(1978) and National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) in holding that the
NTSO rule was not in violation of the First
Amendment because it was content-neutral and
similar to the network broadcasting restriction up-
held in National Broadcasting Co.
The court groups the Commission's defense of
the CBCO rule in with those alleging that the
CBCO rules protect marketplace competition and
promote diversity. Both arguments are dismissed
as "feeble" and "halfhearted." The court's finding
that retention of the CBCO rules was "arbitrary
and capricious" was primarily based on its conclu-
sion that because a cable operator may lawfully be
co-owned with a programmer or network, the rule
does not cure the alleged problem of cable opera-
tors discriminating against stations airing compet-
ing programming, and therefore does nothing in
the way of promoting competition. The court
again relied on Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. in reaching its holding
that the Commission's actions on the CBCO rule
were "arbitrary and capricious." On the diversity
claim, the court reasoned that the Commission
failed to reconcile two competing decisions and
dismissed the argument as "woefully inadequate."
MEDIAONE v. HENRIco CouNTY, 257 F.3d
356 (4th Cir. 2001)
Issue: Whether a county board of supervisors'
decision requiring a cable franchise to provide
any requesting Internet Service Provider with ac-
cess to its cable modem platform, as part of a
transfer of control of the franchise, violates 47
U.S.C. Section 541 (b) (3) (D).
Holding: In affirming the district court's deci-
sion, the court held that the open access provision
was inconsistent with Section 541 (b) (3) (D) of the
Telecommunications Act in that it required
MediaOne to provide telecommunications facili-
ties as a condition for approving transfer of con-
trol of MediaOne's cable franchise to AT&T.
Discussion: Relying on Bell Atlantic Md., Inc. v.
Prince George's County, 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir.
2000), the court first determined that it was ap-
propriate to look to federal law in addressing the
issue as opposed to Virginia state law because Vir-
ginia provided no independent state law ground
for deciding the case. The court then turned to
Section 541 (b) (3) (D) of the 1996 Act, which pro-
hibits a franchising authority from requiring a
cable operator to provide any telecommunica-
tions service or facilities as a condition of a trans-
fer of franchise. While the 1996 Act does not de-
fine the word "facilities," it can be inferred from
the language of the statute that facilities are the
physical installations or infrastructure necessary
for transmission. MediaOne's cable modem plat-
form, separated from the internet service compo-
nent, is a telecommunications facility within the
meaning of 47 U.S.C. Section 541 (b) (3) (D), and,
therefore, the open access provision requiring
MediaOne to provide access to its cable modem
platform was in violation of the statute.
GRID RADio & SzoKA v. FCC, 278 F.3d
1314 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
Issue: Whether a cease broadcasting order and
an ancillary $11,000 forfeiture issued by the FCC
to an operator of a low-power FM radio station are
unenforceable as a result of the FCC's ban on low-
power FM being unconstitutional and in conflict
with the 1934 Act, as well as the forfeiture being
unreasonable, excessive and beyond the opera-
tor's ability to pay.
Holding: The court affirmed the FCC's decision
by holding that it was inappropriate to consider
whether the microbroadcasting ban was unconsti-
tutional because appellant did not take the neces-
sary steps to challenge the constitutionality of the
ban. Furthermore, the imposition of an $11,000
forfeiture penalty was warranted due to appel-
lant's intentional and continuous operation of the
radio station after continued warning by the Com-
mission to cease operations. Appellant waived his
inability to pay the claim because he failed to co-
operate with the Commission's Compliance & In-
formation Bureau.
Discussion: In accordance with Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the court held
that giving Szoka grounds for challenging the
constitutionality of the microbroadcasting ban
merely by operating a low-power FM radio station
without a license would produce the exact chaos
that the microbroadcasting licensing regime was
designed to prevent. Szoka had other avenues for
challenging the constitutional authority of the
ban, such as petitioning for a rulemaking or ap-
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plying for a waiver, and if the Commission denied
the requests he could have challenged that denial
in the appropriate circuit court. Because Szoka
chose neither approach, the court found it was in-
appropriate to consider his challenge to the ban.
The court went on to hold that the FCC's imposi-
tion of the $11,000 maximum penalty for operat-
ing without a license was warranted due to Szoka's
deliberate disregard of the FCC's continued warn-
ings to cease broadcasting. Finally, Szoka waived
any inability to pay claim because, after the FCC
determined that the financial information submit-
ted by Szoka was insufficient to determine
whether he was unable to pay, the FCC invited
Szoka to supplement the information and he de-
clined to do so.
MISSOURI MuNicPAL LEAGUE V. FCC, 299
F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2002)
Issue: Whether 47 U.S.C. Section 253 preempts
a state statute prohibiting municipalities and mu-
nicipally owned utilities from providing telecom-
munications services or facilities.
Holding: In vacating and remanding the deci-
sion of the FCC, the court held that municipali-
ties fall within the definition of the term "entity"
and come within the scope of 47 U.S.C. Section
253(a). Therefore, any state statute that prohibits
the ability of a municipality to provide telecom-
munications services or facilities is subject to fed-
eral preemption.
Discussion: 47 U.S.C. Section 253(a) prohibits
any state from preventing any entity from provid-
ing telecommunications service. In examining
state statutes under Section 253, the FCC first de-
termines whether the statute violates Section
253(a), and if so, the Commission goes on to de-
termine whether the statute comes within the res-
ervation clause of Section 253(b) so as to prevent
preemption. The court relied on the Gregory
rule, first provided in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452 (1991), which requires a determination of
whether the statutory language plainly requires
preemption. Focusing on the term "entity," the
court held that there is little doubt that munici-
palities and municipally owned utilities are enti-
ties under a standard definition of the term and
thus come within the meaning of entity as used in
47 U.S.C. Section 253(a). Because the Commis-
sion previously determined that municipalities
were not entities for purposes of Section 253(a),
there was no need to address the issue of whether
the statute came within the reservation clause of
Section 253(b). Therefore, the court remanded
the decision for consideration of this issue.
SOUTHWESTERN BELL V. 01LAHOMA CORPO-
RATION COMMISSION, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
21624 (10th Cir. 2002)
Issue: Whether two obligations in the 1996 Act
imposed on incumbent service providers, specifi-
cally a resale duty and a duty to provide access to
elements of the incumbent's network, are proper.
Holding: The court reversed the district court's
order pertaining to the end-user limitation, hold-
ing that the single-user-limitation imposed on
AT&T is consistent with the 1996 Act and reasona-
ble because it allows Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone ("SWBT") to protect the access charges it
receives. The court vacated its order dealing with
access to network elements, because both SWBT
and AT&T have reached a new agreement regard-
ing SWBT's obligations with respect to Opera-
tional Support Systems.
Discussion: Congress enacted the 1996 Act to in-
troduce competition in the local service market.
The 1996 Act stipulates that incumbent local ex-
change carriers ("ILECs") have a duty to offer any
telecommunications service offered to non-tele-
communications carrier retail subscribers for re-
sale at wholesale rates. Further, the ILEC may not
impose unreasonable restrictions on the resale of
those telecommunications services. AT&T chal-
lenged (through the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission) SWBT's end-user limitations placed
on its optional toll calling plans ("OTCP") as an
unreasonable resale restriction in violation of the
1996 Act. The District Court held that such end-
user limitations were an unreasonable resale re-
striction, thus violating the 1996 Act. The 1 0 th
Circuit reversed, holding that if AT&T wants to
convert the OTCP into a "different service" than
one offered by SWBT at retail, then SWBT is not
required under the 1996 Act to offer such a ser-
vice to AT&T at a wholesale rate.
CSC HOLDINGS, INC. v. REDISIS, 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22487 (7th Cir. 2002)
Issue: Whether Redisis's statute of limitations
defense has merit and whether the district court's
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discovery rulings and damages calculations should
be reversed.
Holding: The 7th Circuit reversed and remanded
this case, holding that denial of certain discovery
motions was improper and that the damages cal-
culations were not based on "actual damages" and
should be recalculated.
Discussion: The statute of limitations for viola-
tions of 47 U.S.C. Section 553 is two years from
the time of the violation. The statute of limita-
tions is tolled until the injured party knows or has
reason to know that a violation has occurred. In
this case, the district court's denial of certain dis-
covery motions to compel the testimony of
Cablevision's Senior Vice President made it im-
possible for Redisis to prove that the statute of
limitations had run. Usually, discovery rulings are
subject to harmless error analysis under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 61; however, the error in the discovery rul-
ings was not harmless in this case. It went to the
heart of Redisis's defense and the motion to com-
pel the Vice President's testimony should be
granted.
The calculation of damages was not based on
"actual damages" suffered by Cablevision; rather,
it was calculated by the individual viewer habits of
its damages expert. There were plenty of alterna-
tive methods the district court could have taken to
protect the information used by Cablevision's ex-
pert to calculate the damages while allowing
Redisis access to the information to adequately
defend their position.
UNITED STATES TELECOM ASSOCIATION V.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 290
F. 3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
Issue- Whether the FCC adequately considered
the standards set forth in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 when it adopted a uniform na-
tional rule requiring ILECs to lease a variety of
unbundled network elements ("UNEs") to com-
petitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs") in all
geographic markets and customer classes, and
which ordered the unbundling of high frequency
spectrum of copper loop to enable CLECs to pro-
vide digital subscriber service.
Holding The FCC did not adequately consider
the "necessary and impair" standards of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 when it chose to
adopt a uniform national rule, without regard to
any particular market. In addition, the FCC
should not have entered an unbundling order
without first considering the relevance of compe-
tition in broadband services coming from cable
and, to a lesser extent, satellite.
Discussion: The Court rested its decision on
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366,
which criticized the Commission's interpretation
of the Telecommunications Act as too broad.
Congress sought to foster competition in the tele-
phone industry and plainly believed that merely
removing affirmative legal obstructions would not
do the job. It thus charged the FCC with identify-
ing those network elements whose lack would im-
pair would-be competitors' abilities to enter the
market. However, Congress gave no detail as to
either the kind or degree of impairment that
would qualify. As to almost every element the
FCC chose to adopt a uniform national rule un-
bundling in every geographic market and cus-
tomer class, without regard to the state of compet-
itive impairment in any particular market. The
court pointed out that if Congress wanted to give
blanket access to incumbent networks it would
simply have said that whatever requested element
can be provided must be provided.
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. v. FCC,
122 S. Ct. 1646 (2002)
Issue: Whether the FCC's methodology for set-
ting rates for leasing network elements to compet-
itive local exchange carriers was unreasonable.
Holding. First, under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, the FCC can require state utility com-
missions to set rates charged by ILECs for lease of
network elements to CLECs on a forward-looking
basis, untied to the incumbents' historical or past
investments. Second, the methodology chosen by
the FCC to set rates for lease of network elements
to CLECs is not inconsistent with the plain lan-
guage of the Act and is not unreasonable. Third,
the Act does not preclude the FCC from requiring
ILECs to combine elements or their network at
the request of CLECs who cannot combine them-
selves when they lease them to CLECs.
Discussion: In order to foster competition be-
tween monopolistic carriers providing local tele-
phone service and companies seeking to enter lo-
cal markets, provisions of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 entitle the new entrants to lease
elements of the incumbent carriers' local ex-
change networks and direct the FCC to prescribe
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methods for state utility commissions to use in set-
ting rates for the sharing of those elements. Such
'just and reasonable" rates must be based on the
cost of providing the network element.
The FCC sets rates for lease of network ele-
ments to CLECs by calculating the forward look-
ing cost by reference to a hypothetical, most effi-
cient element at existing wire-centers, not the ac-
tual network element being provided.
FCC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, de-
fined the "forward looking" economic cost of an
element as the sum of (1) the total element long-
run incremental cost of the element [TELRIC]
and (2) a reasonable allocation of forward look-
ing common costs. In Hope, the Court held that
regulatory bodies required to set rates have ample
discretion to chose methodology. Because the in-
cumbents have not met the burden of showing
unreasonableness to defeat the deference due the
FCC, the FCC can require state commissions to
set rates charged by incumbents for leased ele-
ments on a forward looking basis, untied to the
incumbents' instruments.
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